The Case Against Assisted Suicide Reexamined by Satz, Ani B.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 100 Issue 6 
2002 
The Case Against Assisted Suicide Reexamined 
Ani B. Satz 
Yale University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Law and Philosophy Commons, and the Medical 
Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ani B. Satz, The Case Against Assisted Suicide Reexamined, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1380 (2002). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol100/iss6/9 
 
This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
THE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE 
REEXAMINED 
Ani B. Satz*' 
'.fHE CASE AGAINST ASSISTED SUICIDE: FOR THE RIGHT TO END-OF­
LIFE CARE. Edited by Kathleen Foley and Herbert Hendin. Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 2002. Pp. xii, 371. $49.95. 
CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION: AUTONOMY, SUFFERING, AND A 
PARENT'S LOVE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . ... . ... ..... .... . ... 1380 
IL OVERVIEW . . . ......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... � . . . . . . . . . .  , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1382 
Ill. PRELIMINARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1383 
IV. ASSISTED SUICIDE AND PALLIATIVE CARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  , . . . . . . . . .  1386 
A. The Argument from Mutual Exclusivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1386 
B. Undermining Palliative Care? .; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1387 
C. Forcing Death? . . . . . . . .  ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1390 
V. AUTONOMY AND SUFFERING REVISITED: THE 
CONCEPTUAL CLAIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1393 
A. The Role of the Professional Ethic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1395 
B. The Actions and Omissions Distinction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1400 
C. The Autonomy of Those Who Wish to Die . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1403 
VI. CONCLUSION: PRACTICE VERSUS POLICY - ANOTHER 
SOLUTION . . . . . . .... .................. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1406 
I. INTRODUCTION: AUTONOMY, SUFFERING, AND A PARENT'S 
LOVE 
When the four horsemen came - schoolteacher, one· nephew, one slave 
catcher, and a sheriff - the house on Bluestone Road was so quiet they 
thought they were too late .... Inside, two boys bled in the sawdust and 
dirt at the feet of a nigger woman holding a blood-soaked child to her 
chest with one hand .... What she go and do that for? On account of a 
beating? ... "What she go and do that for?" -Toni Morrison, Beloved1 
* Lecturer, Department of Philosophy and Ethics, Politics, and Economics Program, 
Yale University. J.D. 2001, University of Michigan; Ph.D. 2001, Monash University, 
Melbourne, Australia (completed at Princeton University). - Ed. The author wishes to 
thank Mathias Risse and Adam F. Scales for their comments on this Review. 
1. TONI MORRISON, BELOVED 148-50(Signet1991} (1987). 
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In Toni Morrison's acclaimed novel Beloved, Sethe, a runaway 
slave woman on the brink of capture, gruesomely murders one of her 
infant children and is halted seconds before killing the second. Cogni­
zant of the approaching men, Sethe's actions are deliberate, swift, con­
fident, and unflinching. Afterwards, she sits erect in the Sheriff's 
wagon. The reader is left to struggle, situating the horror of the event 
within the context of the reality of slavery. Was this an act of mercy tQ 
prevent the suffering Sethe's child would know as a slave? Is loss of 
autonomy, even rising to the condition of slavery, sufficient justifica­
tion for ending a life? Was this a desperate attempt to control an un­
just situation? 
These questions of suffering, self-determination, and control are 
similar to the ones raised within the context of the euthanasia debate 
today. The two primary justifications for euthanasia are often identi­
fied as the prevention of suffering and respect for autonomous choice 
to end one's life (or, for the incompetent person, respect for the 
guardian's autonomous choice, presumably supporting the interests of 
the incompetent individual). Certainly slavery is the extreme example 
of diminished autonomy, and arguably of suffering. Nevertheless, an 
intuitive response that Sethe's actions are morally wrong, or an emo­
tive reaction of shock, is understandable. 
Reflections about such an intuition or emotive response likely 
would reveal concern - not that Sethe ended the life of an infant or 
even that she ended the life of her own child - but that she ended the 
life of a healthy child who might have known a situation other than 
slavery. Further, even if Beloved lived her entire life as a slave, it is 
unclear that her life would have been one only of suffering. At the 
very least, the child could have known love and friendships, even 
within a situation of gross social injustice. 
The killing of Beloved, though an instance of euthanasia, is differ­
ent from assisted suicide, where individuals who are suffering intol­
erably from illness choose to end their lives and require assistance to 
do so. Consider the case of Carla, who received a physician's assis­
tance to terminate her life. 
Carla was 47 years old .... In 1988, Carla noticed a painful swelling in 
her lower abdomen and went to her family doctor. He referred her to a 
gynecologist .... A subsequent operation revealed that the pain had 
been caused by a large malignant tumour on one of Carla's ovaries. By 
the time the operation was performed, the tumour had already grown so 
large that it could not be totally removed 
Carla underwent chemotherapy and by June her condition had greatly 
improved ... [in] March 1990 ... it was found that the tumour had re­
grown. Chemotherapy was tried once more, but this time it was in vain. 
By the middle of the year, Carla's pain had increased to such an ex­
tent that her family doctor had to prescribe opioids (morphine-like 
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drugs). Her condition deteriorated quickly and it was not long before 
Carla had to be readmitted to [the] hospital .... 
She was vomiting constantly .... To prevent thirst, Carla received an 
infusion of a saline solution . . . . ., 
Carla lost a lot of weight and became extremely weak, unable even to 
move around in her bed. This made it very difficult for the nurses to pre­
·� vent bedsores. While C<lrla lost weight, the tumour continued to grow 
and was soon obstructing the blood flow in her legs, causing them to 
swell painfully.2 
Many opponents of assisted suicide argue as if there is no moral 
difference between the death of Beloved and the death of Carla. They 
fear any action intended to terminate the life of a suffering individual. 
This includes actions by doctors within regulated schemes of assisted 
suicide for irreversible and terminal illness requiring informed con­
sent, secondary medical opinions, and waiting periods. One's capacity 
to choose to die is not viewed as morally relevant. Opponents object 
to the assisted suicide of competent individuals as well as those who 
are in a persistent vegetative state. Support for these views purport­
edly stems from the potential for abuse within regulated schemes, the 
availability of other means to alleviate suffering, and the moral distinc­
tion between intending and foreseeing death. The authors whose work 
is the subject of this Review are no exception. 
II. OVERVIEW 
The Case Against Assisted Suicide: For the Right to End-of-Life 
Care is edited by Kathleen Foley3 and Herbert Hendin.4 Foley and 
Hendin are medical doctors who present the self-proclaimed first 
comprehensive examination of the arguments against assisted suicide 
in favor of greater palliative care. The book, a collection of fourteen 
articles by distinguished contributors such as Daniel Callahan, Yale 
Kamisar, and Leon Kass, establishes the case against assisted suicide 
in four steps, comprising each of the book's sections, respectively. The 
first section argues that the philosophical and legal foundations for the 
right or interest in assisted suicide cannot be sustained. Broadly, the 
authors conclude that assisted suicide is inconsistent with autonomy, 
2. Pieter Admiraal, Listening and Helping to Die: The Dutch Way, in BIOETHICS: AN 
ANTHOLOGY 332-39 (Peter Singer & Helga Kuhse eds., 1999). 
3. Professor of Neurology, Neuroscience, and Clinical Pharmacology, Weill Medical 
College of Cornell University; Attending Neurologist, Pain and Palliative Care Service, 
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center. 
4. Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, New York Medical College; Direc­
tor, American Foundation for Suicide Prevention. 
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compassion, and rational choice.5 Even if one believes the philosophi­
cal foundations for assisted suicide are sound, the second section em­
phasizes that, in practice; there are abuses within assisted suicide 
schemes, as the Dutch, American (United States), and Australian ex­
periences demonstrate. The third part of the book addresses the impli­
cations of assisted suicide for vulnerable persons, with special atten­
tion to the concerns of the disabled. The final section argues for the 
importance of quality and more robust hospice and other palliative 
care, leading to the editors' favored solution in the conclusion of a 
states-based initiative to improve end-of-life care, avoiding the need 
for assisted suicide. '· 
The book combines the work of several authors to establish foun­
dations for better palliative care and the prohibition of assisted sui­
cide. It purports to show that assisted suicide should not be allowed 
because it increases vulnerability at the end of life, undermines pallia­
tive and other care, and is unnecessary to relieve suffering. The book 
thereby rejects the claims that assisted suicide supports autonomy of 
the affected person and is needed to relieve suffering at the end of life. 
While I do not believe the collection is persuasive on these points, its 
value lies in its approach to the issue: a philosophical-legal-empirical 
perspective on assisted suicide, advocating a practical solution. 
In order to dismiss the authors' case against assisted suicide, one 
must rebut the conceptual claims as well as account for the empirical 
data and anecdotal evidence presented. This Review focuses primarily 
on philosophical claims. This is accomplished, I believe, while taking 
seriously the editors' charge that philosophers and lawyers, removed 
from patient care, must account for the realities of clinical practice 
(pp. 4-5). Any ph�losopher. writing in the field of medical ethics who is 
worth her salt must accept this task. I do not attempt to dispute the 
empirical data provided by the physicians in this book, but only to re­
veal problems with the conclusions and inferences drawn from that 
data. I have both macro and micro concerns, but first there are some 
preliminary issues to resolve. 
· 
Ill. PRELIMINARIES 
It is necessary to clarify what I mean by "euthanasia" and "assisted 
suicide." Different forms of euthanasia are often conflated in the col­
lection. Euthanasia literally means "good death"; the prefix "eu" in 
Greek means "good" and "thanatos" means "death." The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines "euthanasia" as " [a] gentle and easy 
death," and this is the definition commonly used.6 Either definition 
5. Yale Kamisar provides a particularly valuable overview of the current state of the law 
on the matter. See chapter 4. 
6. THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 862 (1993) [hereinafter OED]. 
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may include death not caused by illness. The Oxford definition, how­
ever, refers only to the mode of death or the way in which someone 
dies. Adopting the Oxford definition, opponents of euthanasia, in­
cluding several of the authors of the collection, invoke the specter of 
Nazi concentration camps, where the gas chambers killed those unsus­
pecting of wrongdoing "gently and easily." 
When used in the medical decisionmaking context, however, a 
more sophisticated definition of euthanasia is necessary. Euthanasia is 
viewed as a gentle and easy death that is for the sake or the good of the 
person who dies.7 This places the focus upon the purpose of death -
the good of the patient - rather than upon the mode of death.8 It is a 
more suitable understanding of what euthanasia is for ethical and legal 
purposes, as the relevant question is whether euthanasia is for the 
benefit of the one who dies, not whether the method used to terminate 
the patient's life is of a certain sort.9 
There are several types of euthanasia. 10 Voluntary euthanasia oc­
curs at the request of the person killed. It may be a request for imme­
diate action or one for future action, for example, through a "living 
will," a request not to continue living under specified conditions. In­
voluntary euthanasia is when a person's life is taken without her con­
sent, even though the individual possesses the capacity to consent. 
This might occur if the person's desires are not known, or, in the alter­
native, if her desire to continue living is known but ignored. Nonvol­
untary euthanasia occurs when the person whose life is terminated is 
not capable of understanding the choice between life and death; in this 
sense, she is incompetent. Persons without the capacity to consent in­
clude newborns and very young children as well as adolescents and 
adults who have lost the capacity due to accident, illness, or old age. 
Only voluntary and nonvoluntary euthanasia are relevant for present 
purposes. 
Assisted 'suicide is understood as euthanasia involving the assis­
tance of another, usually to provide the drugs or implement that a pa­
tient will use to end her life. If the patient is physically incapable of 
ending her own life, the third party may assist more directly by ad­
ministering the drugs or employing another mechanism to end the pa­
tient's life. 11 Physician-assisted suicide is assisted suicide when the third 
7. Philippa Foot, Euthanasia, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 85 (1977). 
8. Id. 
9. Here the concern is only with intentional acts. The conceptual claim that there is a 
moral difference between death arising from foreseen but unintentional acts and death that 
occurs as the result of foreseen and intentional acts is discussed below. See infra Section V.B. 
10. These basic distinctions are taken from PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 176-81 
(2nd ed. 1993). 
11. The introduction to the collection limits assisted suicide to cases where the patient 
administers lethal drugs prescribed by a physician who understands the patient's intention to 
use them to end her life. P. 5. Euthanasia is distinguished from assisted suicide on the ground 
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party is a medical doctor. The common understanding of physician­
assisted suicide (hereinafter "assisted suicide") is that it requires ex­
plicit (current or former) consent of the patient or, in the case of an 
incompetent person, consent of the guardian. Nonvoluntary euthana­
sia and some forms of voluntary euthanasia may involve assisted sui­
cide. 
"Palliative care" may be understood as care that temporarily alle­
viates suffering or the symptoms of disease without curing it. 12 This 
care is often associated with the terminally ill, who are the focus of this 
Review. 13 Those who are terminally ill and request assisted suicide are 
understood to be in the process of dying and to be suffering unbeara­
bly, as defined by the person herself (if competent) or her guardian (if 
incompetent), but within medical understanding of pain and incapac­
ity. 14 This might include those who have lost all control of their mus­
cles, are in intolerable pain (or extreme, visible pain, in the case of the 
incompetent person), or are suffering·from severe dementia. 
Some of the authors argue that there is no strong correlation be­
tween suffering and the decision to commit suicide, and that most who 
make such a request do so out of a feeling of loss of control, often with 
a history of mental illness:15 If loss of control is a result of physical or 
mental incapacitation resulting from illness, there may be a substantial 
correlation to suffering. In other cases� such as those of mental illness 
where a person is incompetent to make an autonomous decision, as­
sisted suicide may be inappropriate. 16 
that it may involve direct physician action to terminate a patient's life. This distinction does 
not appear to be used consistently throughout the book. For example, in chapter 8, Gregory 
Hamilton discusses assisted suicide of individuals who are unable to self-administer lethal 
drugs who may need or ask for letllal injection. Pp. 183-84. 
12. See OED, supra note 6, at 2077. 
13. Palliative care and assisted suicide may be relevant in other contexts, however, in­
cluding those of the chronically ill, depressed, and brain dead, and these topics merit discus­
sion elsewhere. 
14. This is not intended as a comprehensive definition of "terminally ill," but rather as a 
starting place to explore the issues raised in the collection. 
It is difficult to know where to place assisted suicide for persons who are in a persistent 
vegetative state, since one may "live" for many years in such a state. It is only after life­
sustaining equipment ("extraordinary means") is removed that the end of an individual's life 
is near, and she may be understood to receive palliative care for a terminal condition in the 
sense that the term is being used here. 
15. See, e.g., p. 67; see also infra p. 1388 and accompanying notes. 
16. At various points throughout the book, the autllors make an argument against as­
sisted suicide along the lines that few individuals would benefit from assisted suicide, given 
suffering and autonomy requirements. For example, they argue that those who are de­
pressed should not be allowed to request assisted suicide; few individuals cannot be relieved 
of suffering by pain medication; and knowledge of palliative care options shifts a physician's 
or patient's desire to perform and request assisted suicide in some cases. Whether or not 
these claims are true, they only speak to the type of individuals who may appropriately re­
quest assisted suicide, not to the morality of the practice. 
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IV. ASSISTED SUICIDE AND PALLIATIVE CARE 
A. The Argument from Mutual Exclusivity 
[Vol. 100:1380 
The authors present a case against assisted suicide in order to "ad­
vance an open and tolerant discussion to address how we as a society 
can provide better health care and social support to those who are 
uniquely vulnerable and suffering" (p. vii). Assisted suicide and pallia­
tive care are thereby viewed as mutually exclusive. What is curious 
about this is that there is no necessary connection between the 
availability (legally and effectively) of assisted suicide and excellent 
palliative care and social support. Legally prohibiting assisted suicide 
will neither necessarily improve palliative care or social support nor 
make it more accessible to patients. Palliative care is one form of 
health care, and it simply might not be a political or social priority. It 
is the unfortunate situation in the United States, for instance, that 
health care of many sorts is denied to people who cannot afford it. 
Similarly, legalized and accessible assisted suicide services need 
not preclude excellent palliative care and social support (for ease, the 
argument will now focus upon palliative care). The two end-of-life op­
tions are not mutually exclusive, in principle or practice. In principle, 
there may be strong moral reasons to provide both assisted suicide and 
palliative care. Respect for autonomy in deciding how best to end an 
individual's pain and suffering, for example, might morally justify both 
practices. 
The argument from mutual exclusivity also relies upon the false as­
sumption that individuals, in practice, would not choose assisted sui­
cide if excellent palliative care were available. Consider cases where 
the terminally ill person faces a choice between heavy sedation (a pal­
liative care option) and death (assisted suicide). There is no reason to 
assume that all individuals would prefer heavy sedation, seriously im­
pairing cognitive abilities and other functioning. 17 Others may utilize 
both options, for example, choosing palliation during the initial stages 
of their illness, when heavy sedation is not required to relieve pain, 
and assisted suicide during the later stages, when such sedation is nec­
essary. 
17. See infra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing "C3," a case presented by Her­
bert Hendin in chapter 6). 
The intention/foresight distinction is of relevance here. See infra Section V.B. for argu­
ment toward its refutation. 
Leon Kass speaks about the "distort[ion) [of) awareness" sometimes associated with an­
algesia that is adequate to relieve pain. P. 23. He claims that in most cases, sedation can re­
move the patient from a state of suffering. Id. Some argue, however, that the resulting qual­
ity of life may have no value for the patient. Id. If the only possible relief of suffering is a 
state of life that an individual does not value, it is unclear how this presents the patient with 
a dignified and decent alternative. 
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Relatedly, the authors incorrectly claim that assisted suicide is not 
necessary to relieve suffering. Suffering may have both a subjective 
and an objective element. Standard medical practice may dictate that 
X units of pain or discomfort may be treated with Y drug, for example, 
but even accounting for necessary variations in doses between indi­
viduals with the same condition, one individual may suffer while an­
other does not. Perhaps the time spent, or side effects of, receiving Y 
drug is part of the suffering for one person but not for another. Of 
course, the opposite may also be true. An individual may require less 
of Y drug for X units of pain due to coping mechanisms, social sup­
ports, or spiritual or other beliefs that reduce suffering. This is not 
universalizable, though, and fails to support a prohibition of assisted 
suicide. It is also doubtful that even in very technologically advanced 
societies it will be possible to relieve all pain and discomfort without 
hastening death through drug use. 
B. Undermining Palliative Care? 
The falsely perceived mutual exclusivity of assisted suicide and 
palliative care leads the authors to conclude that allowing assisted sui­
cide would necessarily undermine the development and availability of 
palliative care, forcing individuals who are suffering to choose assisted 
suicide. The authors' argument relies upon an interpretation of care­
givers' incentives. They argue that caregivers will offer assisted suicide 
instead of palliative care because it is less costly and more expedient. 
As a result, there will be no incentive to develop palliative care. 
To support this proposition, the collection cites the situation in the 
Netherlands, where assisted suicide is legal and there is limited physi­
cian knowledge about palliative care and there are few palliative care 
centers. Despite the fact that this seems less of a concern in the United 
States, where limited access to palliative care results in substantial part 
from lack of funding of health care and quality of care standards 
(pp. 307-08), there need not be a correlation between a physician rec­
ommending assisted suicide and that physician lacking knowledge 
about advanced palliative care options. 18 One contributor to the col­
lection, Zbigniew Zylicz, a palliative care specialist, observes a reluc­
tance among general practitioners to support requests for hastening 
death, presumably by any means (p. 127). Yet, these same practitio­
ners are understood to have "only a superficial knowledge of palliative 
medicine" (p. 123). 
18. Kathleen Foley identifies lack of physician knowledge about palliative care in the 
United States mostly in terms of physicians' fear that use of morphine and other pain­
relieving drugs may hasten death and thereby be a form of active euthanasia. Pp. 304-05. 
This does not show substantial lack of knowledge about palliative care options. 
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The authors present a weaker argument that assisted suicide will 
undermine palliative care because it will lead to abuses resulting in the 
denial of such care. They cite underreporting of assisted suicides and 
lack of consultation with an independent physician as two indicators of 
abuse. In the Netherlands, underreporting of assisted suicides was at 
82% and 59% in 1990 and 1995, respectively (p. 104), and lack of con­
sultation with another, independent physician occurred in approxi­
mately 50% of cases (p. 103). 
Killing when individuals are not terminally ill and lack of informed 
consent present perhaps the greatest concern over use of assisted sui­
cide in the Netherlands. Those suffering from depression might fit ei­
ther or both categories. In their essay about the Oregon experiment 
with assisted suicide, Foley and Hendin assert that "most of those who 
respond to terminal illness with a desire to hasten death are suffering 
from depression" (p. 150). Contributor and psychiatrist Gregory 
Hamilton stated of the Oregon experience that "depression played a 
part in any of that year's fifteen cases" (p. 179). Similarly, David 
Kissane argues that the "prominent features of depression" (p. 203) or 
patient "demoralization," characterized by a "loss of any worthwhile 
hope and meaning" (p. 203) in one's life, was a factor in seven docu­
mented assisted suicides performed in the Northern Territory of 
Australia, including at least three of the four that occurred under the 
Rights of the Terminally Ill Act (1995). 19 
Foley and Hendin cite statistics pertaining to the Dutch experi­
ence, where according to studies performed in 1990 and 1995, 0.8% 
and 0.7%, respectively, of patients were killed without their consent 
(p. 104). Of these patients, 37% (1990) and 21 % (1995) were compe­
tent (pp. 105-06). Foley and Hendin claim that the death rate of such 
persons actually is much higher, as the researchers did not include 
deaths caused by pain medication administered with the intention of 
causing death; this increases the figures to 3.7% and 4.7% of all deaths 
for 1990 and 1995, respectively (p. 105). The competence rate for these 
later persons is believed to be about 20% (pp. 105-06). 
Assuming these figures are accurate and the studies are valid (the 
1990 study has been challenged),20 it is unclear how prohibiting as­
sisted suicide as the authors understand it would correct these abuses. 
Using the authors' own figures, in the Netherlands, euthanasia listed 
independently of assisted suicide is much more frequent than assisted 
suicide, 2.2% and 0.4% percent of all deaths, respectively (p. 123). 
Prior to the legalization of assisted suicide, the suicide rate of those 
over fifty was one-third higher (p. 112). Anecdotal evidence presented 
19. Pp. 199-202, 204-05. The Act was in effect from 1996-97. 
20. See PETER SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH: THE COLLAPSE OF OUR 
TRADITIONAL ETHICS 151-54 (1994) [hereinafter SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH]. 
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by the authors suggests that .when assisted suicide was unavailable to 
individuals, patients found other means to take their lives, with and 
without the assistance of others.2 1 
Nevertheless, serious concern remains that competent individuals 
may have their lives taken without their consent if assisted suicide is 
allowed. The above statistics and the conclusion of the 1995 study, that 
patients should make an affirmative statement of their desire to con­
tinue living (p. 117), is of special alarm, as is noncompliance with the 
independent, second physician opinion requirement. More factors 
need to be known about these cases. Did the individual express a de­
sire not to live in a certain condition, even though explicit consent to 
take her life was not provided? Was she experiencing such great suf­
fering that pain medication was administered (without an intention to 
kill) that took her life before consent could be given (or that blurred 
the capacity for consent)? Was another physician unavailable to pro­
vide a second opinion? 
Regardless, noncompliance is an enforcement rather than an ethi­
cal issue. It is unlikely that the degree of alleged noncompliance with 
guidelines in the :Netherlands would occur in the United States where 
litigation is more frequent.22 There also is suggestion that assisted sui­
cide would be more heavily regulated in the United States. For exam­
ple, the Oregon Death with Dignity Act (1997),23 in addition to re­
quiring a written request signed by two witnesses and two oral 
requests fifteen days apart (p. 155), states that "[a] person who coerces 
or exerts undue influence on a patient to request medication for the 
purpose of ending the patient's life . . .  shall be guilty of a Class A fel­
ony" (p. 155; internal quotation marks omitted). Oregon, however, 
applies a subjective "good faith" standard, rather than the stricter 
negligence standard typical of malpractice claims, to physicians who 
engage in assisted suicide (p. 159). Additionally, censure of physicians 
by medical organizations is forbidden (pp. 190-91). The truth is that, as 
Foley and Hendin and Gregory Hamilton demonstrate in their respec­
tive chapters, much is unknown about the practice of assisted suicide 
in Oregon. Abuses may occur, but greater safeguards are in place in 
the United States than those existing in the Netherlands. Speculation 
about such abuse does not justify legal prohibition of assisted suicide. 
21. See, e.g., pp. 182-83, 188, 196-97. 
22. Hendin states that, in the Netherlands, malpractice suits are rare. P. 118. He also 
perceives a unique Dutch character and culture, one ambivalent towards (medical) author­
ity, as responsible for the prevalence and abuse of assisted suicide in the Netherlands. Pp. 
117-20. 
23. OR. REV. STAT.§§ 127.800-.995 (2001). 
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C. Forcing Death? 
The authors attempt to demonstrate that the availability of assisted 
suicide will result in individuals being pressured or otherwise forced to 
die, foregoing palliative or other care. This claim about restricted 
choice is one version of the argument about voluntariness or auton­
omy. The authors hold that even if consent is given, it will not be truly 
voluntary, due to the familial pressures that individuals experience, 
lack of broader social supports for those who are alone, or physician 
suggestion.24 In short, the best scenario under this argument is that 
terminally ill individuals will perceive a duty to die. Here the implicit 
assumption is that rational people would not choose to die. In the 
worst scenario, their lives will be taken without consent of any sort. 
The latter is not the type of assisted suicide in question because it 
would be involuntary; the assisted suicide considered is based upon 
consent or prior consent of competent persons or caregivers of the in­
competent. Note that the claim that the availability of assisted suicide 
will result in individuals perceiving a duty to die is different from the 
conceptual claim that there is a duty of some terminally ill patients to 
die. The first is the empirical claim we are addressing, and the second 
is a separate conceptual claim, which the authors do not address.2 5 
The authors do not provide sufficient empirical evidence that indi­
viduals who choose to die perceive a duty to die because of lack of 
palliative care options. The three case studies presented - the 
Netherlands, Oregon, and the Australian Northern Territory - dem­
onstrate at best, and largely anecdotally, that individuals choose to die 
because they perceive death as their best option. 
The article by Dutch palliative care doctor Zylicz is most informa­
tive. Zylicz, who asserts that he refuses to practice assisted suicide, 
states that many of his patients want to die quickly (p. 129) and that 
the median stay at the hospice he directs is twelve days (p. 125). Care 
is provided to one group of patients with the explicit intention of has­
tening death (pp. 137-38). 
Setting aside the issue of whether Zylicz really practices a sophisti­
cated form of euthanasia in these particular cases (given the intention 
to accelerate death), Zylicz's article illuminates what really is at issue. 
24. The authors argue that a physician merely suggesting assisted suicide as an option 
might not only violate the doctor-physician relationship, as discussed infra Section V.A., but 
subtly coerce patients to choose assisted suicide. See, e.g., pp. 24, 155-56. In the United 
States, however, legal conceptions of informed consent require knowledge of one's alterna­
tives; in fact, one might sue if not provided this information. P. 156. 
25. This issue is addressed in John Hardwig, ls There a Duty to Die?, in BIOETHICS, su­
pra note 2 (finding a duty to die in some circumstances). Diane Coleman mentions this arti­
cle in passing but fails to address the underlying conceptual claim in any detail. P. 228. 
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The ideal situation is improved medical care.26 It is a world in which 
terminally ill patients understand their palliative care options and 
spend their last days under the care of a physician like Zylicz in one of 
his nine hospice beds in a pristine, wooded environment. If possible, 
all pain is removed in dying, and one's life might be extended in a 
meaningful way (as determined by the patient herself) for a brief in­
terval in the process. This is not, however, the world in which most 
people live, since they cannot afford such care. 
Patients choosing assisted suicide, then, make up the following 
categories: 
CJ: Those who do not understand their palliative care options 
and choose to die by assisted suicide. 
C2: Those who understand their palliative care options and 
are unable to afford palliative care or for whom it is oth­
erwise unavailable (e.g., due to long waiting lists) 
(p. 124) and choose to die by assisted suicide. 
CJ: Those who understand their palliative care options, are 
able to afford palliative care, have access to it, and choose 
to die by assisted suicide. These include the "extreme" 
cases Zylicz speaks of (although Zylicz would disagree 
with this characterization),27 where individuals are unable 
to be relieved of the pain from which they suffer 
(pp. 137-38). They may be assisted in suicide, although 
"sedation" may be used over other means of assisted sui­
cide such as lethal injection. 
Cl and C2 are the situations faced by most people discussed in the 
collection. Certainly informing patients of palliative care options 
(relevant to Cl), which seems an overriding concern for many of the 
authors, is easily accomplished through national information cam­
paigns or physician education and more properly enforced informed 
consent regulations. It is indeed wrong to solve medical problems with 
euthanasia when there are other, less drastic measures available to an 
individual that one would choose, if only one had knowledge of them. 
That says nothing, however, about whether individuals should be enti-...­
tled to assisted suicide, if they autonomously desire it. 
In both CJ and C2, death may be chosen because the patient lacks 
family or friends able to care for her and is financially unable to afford 
any other option, or, in the alternative, does not wish to receive insti-
26. P. 142-43. Zylicz comes close to acknowledging this when he states, "we need to de­
polarize the discussion of euthanasia and move forward. We should concentrate on provid­
ing good care and preventing the disappointments and the neglect that terminally ill patients 
often experience." P. 143. 
27. The basis for Zylicz's disagreement is unclear. How does one distinguish between 
sedation to bring about immediate death and assisted suicide by other means? CJ represents 
a case where palliation is no longer appropriate. 
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tutional care. Inability to pay for palliative care, though a tragic reason 
to choose to die, may in some countries, especially those without uni­
versal health care coverage, be one's best option. It would be immoral, 
and a serious violation of autonomy, to suggest that individuals who 
cannot afford palliative care should be made to suffer intolerably. 
It seems that the authors confuse the weight of the moral argu­
ments for health care with those against assisted suicide. Kissane as­
serts, for example, that "[w]hile we remain unable to guarantee the 
quality of medical care within our socit:(ties, there can be no place for 
euthanasia. "28 This statement is seriously misguided, as a right or in­
terest in palliative care does not rise or fall with a right or interest in 
assisted suicide. There are strong moral reasons that better palliative 
care should be developed and available. The availability of assisted 
suicide does not undermine such development, however, lack of re­
sources for health care does.29 Assisted suicide is justifiable iµdepend­
ently on the ground that it provides relief for terminally ill patients 
experiencing unbearable pain or other suffering. 
Cutting across these arguments about palliative health care are 
concerns about access to mental health care, especially for the de­
pressed dying. The complicating factor is that even an attending physi­
cian who is knowledgeable about the range of available mental health 
care services may fail to recognize a dying patient's need for them. 
Physician education about depression is vital to avoid Cl. If access to 
mental health care is limited by inability to pay for such services, as it 
is under C2, the arguments above apply with equal force. 
In sum, while the lack of any form of health care (palliative or oth­
erwise) or other basic social goods, for that matter, might lead one to 
desire to end one's life, that has nothing to do with whether there is a 
moral justification for the availability of assisted suicide. The moral 
(and concomitant legal) justification either exists or not, regardless of 
material resources and supports. A valid point could be made to sup­
port the authors' claim along the lines that it is unjust that the society 
in which we live today, due to political constraints, limits funding for 
health care services (including palliative care services), but that is a 
different issue. 
28. P. 208. Foley cites the World Health Organization as holding a similar view: "mem­
ber states (should] not consider legislation allowing for physician assisted suicide or euthana­
sia until they ha[ve] assured for their citizens the availability of services for pain relief and 
palliative care" P. 294 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Coleman, p. 224, "[t]he 
inadequacy of the in-home long-term care system is central to the assisted suicide and 
euthanasia debate." 
29. The exception would be if assisted suicide is funded but palliative care options are 
not funded. Gregory Hamilton states that "Oregon's rationed health plan denies payment 
for 171 needed services, while it fully funds assisted suicide for the poor." P. 180. These 
services are not described by Hamilton, however. 
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In a utopian society, where palliative care is the best that it can be 
and alleviates greater amounts of suffering, there may indeed be fewer 
cases of assisted suicide. In fact, this is likely to be the case. This does 
not preclude one from arguing consistently, however, that there are 
moral reasons that assisted suicide should be available. It would be 
grossly paternalistic to argue that since palliative care is an option, it 
must be the only option.30 
V. AUTONOMY AND SUFFERING REVISITED: THE CONCEPTUAL 
CLAIMS 
The conceptual arguments cutting across· the essays, though ex­
pressed in different terms at times, may be understood to embody four 
premises: 
Pl: Assisted suicide violates the professional ethic of medical 
practitioners. 
· · 
P2: There is a moral difference between actions and omis­
sions. 
P3: Assisted suicide violates the autonomy of those individu­
als who are killed; 
P4: Assisted suicide discriminates against vulnerable popula­
tions. 
Premise two may be understood as having several sub-premises: 
P2/SPJ: There is a moral difference between killing and 
letting die. 
P2/SP2: There is a moral difference between ordinary and 
extraordinary life-sustaining treatments. 
P2/SP3: There is a moral difference between· providing care 
where one foresees death and intending death 
through the same medical act. (This also is known as 
the intention/foresight distinction or the doctrine of 
double-effect.) 
The first sub-premise, P2/SPJ, is most closely related to the gen­
eral understanding of the umbrella distinction between actions and 
omissions. The second sub-premise, P2/SP2, seeks to make a distinc­
tion between ordinary or routine medical care and extraordinary life­
sustaining treatments, where the former but not the latter need be 
provided.31 The problem is that what is ordinary in one case may be 
extraordinary in another. Consider the difference between providing 
30. A similar point is made in SINGER, supra note 10, at 199. 
31. This view is set forth by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 
DECLARATION ON EUTHANASIA (Vatican City 1980), reprinted in BIOETHICS, supra note 2, 
at 203-06. 
· 
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�antibiotics to treat the throat infection of an end-stage AIDS patient 
predicted to live only a few days and providing them to a 
seven-year-old schoolgirl who is otherwise healthy. Given limited re­
sources, aiding the dying patient may be viewed as extraordinary, 
whereas treating the schoolgirl, who presumably has a long, healthy 
life ahead, would be ordinary medical practice. 
The third sub-premise, P2/S3, holds that if one action has two ef­
fects - one morally justified and one not morally justified, it is the in­
tention behind the action that matters.32 So, providing a high dose of 
morphine might reduce pain and end someone's life, but this is ac­
ceptable if the medical practitioner administering the morphine did 
not intend for the patient to die. Stated another way, there is a moral 
difference between a physician foreseeing the death of the patient 
from the morphine, when it is merely an unwanted side effect of re­
lieving suffering, and providing morphine with an intention to kill the 
patient. This premise is alternatively termed the active/passive eutha­
nasia distinction,· where "active" includes an intention to kill and "pas­
sive" does not. All three of these sub-premises will be discussed in 
terms of the umbrella distinction of acts versus omissions. 
Premise four, P4, the conceptual claim that assisted suicide dis­
criminates against vulnerable populations, cannot be sufficiently ad­
dressed within the confines of this Review and warrants discussion 
elsewhere. A few points are of necessary note here, however, espe­
cially since the editors emphasize a related empirical claim, namely 
that legalizing assisted suicide increases the vulnerability of those who 
are dying (p. vii). All individuals who are terminally ill and seek as­
sisted suicide are vulnerable. The elderly, the depressed, and the dis­
abled - the focus of P4 - are especially vulnerable, in the sense that 
there may be negative external perceptions about the value of their 
lives that limit their material resources or social supports in ways that 
other people with terminal illnesses do not experience. For these rea­
sons, Pl and P3 - concerns about the role of physicians in assisted 
suicide and autonomous patient decisionmaking - may apply with 
greater force to these particularly vulnerable populations, but no new 
issues are raised. If there is discrimination to be found, it results from 
limits upon financial or social supports for particularly vulnerable 
populations that are not experienced by other terminally ill patients. If 
such discrimination exists, it should be prevented, but it fails to pro­
vide justification for prohibiting assisted suicide. 
Frequently discussed under the conceptual claim that assisted sui­
cide discriminates against vulnerable populations, particularly the dis-
32. This view is widely held among Roman Catholic theologians and moral philosophers 
and dates back at least to the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. In chapter 4 of the collection, 
especially pp. 78-82, Kamisar provides a discussion of the role of this doctrine in Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
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abled, is the view that external quality of life judgments, assumed to 
be moral judgments, discriminate against the disabled. Under this 
view, external quality of life judgments cast a value judgment about 
the moral worth of someone living with a particular disability. This is a 
different argument, however, from the claim about disparate treat­
ment provided above, for it relies upon proof that quality of life judg­
ments are moral judgments and that they actually do cast judgment on 
the worth of the person with the disability. I have argued elsewhere 
that these judgments do not discriminate against the disabled, al­
though they are moral judgments and may be deeply hurtful and of­
fensive.33 The other premises, Pl-P3, will now be discussed in turn. 
A. The Role of the Professional Ethic 
Leon Kass presents perhaps the most direct argument that assisted 
suicide violates the principles and values of the medical profession. He 
argues that contemporary ethical approaches to assisted suicide, those 
based upon autonomy or objective measures about quality of life, mis­
understand the ethical foundations of medical practice.34 Rather, the 
medical profession, based upon an ethic where the "technique and 
conduct are both ordered in relation to an overreaching good, the 
naturally given end of health," cannot support assisted suicide.35 This 
conclusion is based upon a negative duty that doctors must not kill, 
which is part of the Hippocratic Oath taken by physicians since the 
fifth century: "I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for 
it, nor will I make a suggestion to this effect" (p. 32; internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
33. Ani B. Satz, Prenatal Genetic Testing and Discrimination Against the Disabled: A 
Conceptual Analysis, MONASH BIOETHICS REV., Oct. 1999, at 11. 
34. See generally chapter 1. 
35. P. 20. Edmund Pellegrino presents a similar position based not upon the role of the 
physician per se but upon the morally justifiable way to exercise compassion. Pellegrino be­
lieves that "true compassion" entails "acts of co-suffering." See generally chapter 2. These 
acts are ones in which family, friends, and medical practitioners must share the burden of 
dying with the patient by generally showing solidarity and identifying with her needs. 
Pp. 48-51. Pellegrino argues that true compassion requires relieving pain to the greatest ex­
tent possible without hastening or taking life. P. 51. Assisted suicide does not support true 
compassion, according to Pellegrino, because it relies upon a notion of compassion that is 
not linked to a particular moral standard, presumably like co-suffering. P. 48. As a result, 
many possible abuses may ensue under the name of compassion, largely because the patient 
who is under family and social pressures cannot autonomously decide to end her own life. 
Pp. 46-48. It is unclear, however, why co-suffering could not support assisted suicide. If Cal­
lahan is correct to state that "[s]uicide is . . .  not a private act at all. Families have to live with 
its aftermath," then could not co-suffering occur by supporting that person's decision to end 
her life? P. 67. Also, accompanying a person to physician appointments that precede her de­
cision to end her life or being a supportive presence during the decisionmaking process itself 
seems like a form of co-suffering. Further, Pellegrino is incorrect that a patient is incapable 
of making an autonomous decision about ending her life due to family and other pressures. 
See infra Section V.C. 
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Kass defends his position on grounds appealing to both what he 
perceives as the negative consequences of assisted suicide and the 
proper role of medicine. The negative consequences result from the 
lack of autonomous decisionmaking on the part of patients (the dis­
cussion will return to this below) and from taking lives when pain and 
suffering may be relieved in other ways.36 Kass believes changes in the 
doctor-patient relationship will affect the role of medicine. He asks: 
For how can you trust stranger-doctors to be wholeheartedly devoted to 
your best interests once they have a license to kill? ... The nurse or in­
tern enters late at night with a syringe full of yellow stuff .... Never 
mind that, for now, death can be legally prescribed only on request. How 
soundly will you sleep? (p. 28; emphasis in original) 
Although he is not writing from a utilitarian perspective, Kass pre­
sents a classical utilitarian argument. Widespread fear of being killed 
when one desires to continue living will undermine the good of pro­
viding assisted suicide. The fear itself would be detrimental to an indi­
vidual and would disrupt the trust inherent to the doctor-patient rela­
tionship. Patients undoubtedly would be reluctant to seek care. This 
fear is only rational, however, if consent is not involved in assisted sui­
cide. Kass states that he makes this argument " [a ]ctual abuses aside," 
so it does not hold if we are concerned only with autonomous 
decisionmakers (p. 27). The possible exception might be fears about 
being temporarily insane or having impaired judgment. This would not 
be a problem with trusting a doctor to act in accordance with your will, 
however, and is mitigated by the requirement of a second physician 
opinion, as under the Dutch and Oregon systems. 
In addition, Kass asserts there will be a more subtle disruption of 
trust between doctors and patients. The availability of assisted suicide 
will cause the patient to question whether the doctor wishes that the 
patient were dead (p. 28). As a result, the patient will become mis­
trustful, "produc[ing] stress, anger, and resistance to treatment" 
(p. 28). Whether or not one's particular physician engages in the prac­
tice will not matter; entitlement of the profession to conduct assisted 
suicide causes the trust violation (p. 29). On the other side, Kass be­
lieves that doctors may act with less interest in maintaining their pa­
tients' lives, particularly if they are difficult to cure (p. 29). He cites 
disparate treatment of individuals with "do not resuscitate" ("DNR") 
orders as an example of the mistreatment of patients who may die 
(p. 29). He goes one step further to say that preventing assisted suicide 
guards against physicians' weaknesses and arrogance that may lead to 
prejudicial judgment about the value of others' lives.37 Kass believes 
36. See supra Section IV.B. 
37. P. 29. It is ironic that, as evidence of the need to guard against physician arrogance 
and biased opinions, Kass cites a friend and doctor's opinion that " '[o)nly because I knew 
that I could not and would not kill my patients was I able to enter most fully and intimately 
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that these quality of life judgments necessarily must be "decidedly 
nonmedical and nonprofessional."38 · c 
This second set of arguments lacks intuitive force. If some patients 
with DNR orders are treated inappropriately, this does not mean that 
DNR orders should be prohibited. It means only that there must be 
enforcement of proper medical practice. Similarly, assisted suicide 
need not be prevented in order to guard against physician weakness 
and arrogance in end-of-life decisionmaking for others. Professional 
organizations and regulations should enforce the physician's role as a 
professional who discloses information to the patient, rather than one 
who makes end-of-life decisions for the patient. 
Further, physician-assisted suicide does not pose a unique threat to 
individuals' lives. There are many people that one must trust who 
might legally, under certain circumstances, take our lives - such as 
police or soldiers acting in the line of duty or individuals who act in 
self-defense - and in these situations, one's life is even taken with 
one's (tacit) consent. It is true that these people are not in the same 
fiduciary relationship as doctor and patient, and that one does not 
make oneself vulnerable to them in the same ways, but in either group 
of situations,' there is a possibility that one's life could be taken. In ad­
dition, patients accept a multitude of other ways in which doctors 
might violate their trust legally without the consequences Kass sug­
gests. These include failing to address one's concerns or treating them 
as insignificant, subjecting one to slightly unnecessary testing for re­
search purposes that the doctor could justify if pressed, or engaging in 
very directive or biased counseling. 
It is also unclear why incorporating a subjective element in the de­
cisionmaking process to elucidate what constitutes intolerable suffer­
ing is both nonmedical and nonprofessional and why it must be based 
upon the physician's personal standards: If the patient believes that 
she is suffering intolerably and the level of suffering is clinically 
viewed as severe, why is it wrong for the physician to help that person 
die? Does the fact that another patient with the same condition might 
not ask to die sµpport this claim? Certainly not; the subjective assess­
ment must initially come from the patient. The doctor merely acts 
within the realm of standard medical practice, where some discretion 
is allowed.39 
into caring for them as they lay dying.' " P. 30. 
38. P. 29. Daniel Callahan presents a parallel argument: 
A decision for physician-assisted suicide is not a medical but a moral decision. Faced with a 
patient reporting great suffering, a doctor cannot, therefore, justify physician-assisted suicide 
on purely medical grounds . . . .  It must be the doctor's moral reason to act, not the patient's 
reason (even though their reasons may coincide). 
P. 64 (emphasis in original). 
39. This also responds to Kass' concern that respecting the "wishes of the patient as cli­
ent or consumer" means that any service may be bought for a price. P. 19. 
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The last and perhaps greatest threat to the medical profession 
posed by assisted suicide, as identified by Kass, is the separation of the 
person from the body (pp. 32-40). The medical profession must seek, 
in part, to heal people.40 The "person" has a mind and body, and in or­
der to be able to heal that person, she must continue to exist. Quite 
simply, a physician cannot engage in assisted suicide because there is 
no benefit to the person - the entity whose mind and body is at stake 
- after death (pp. 33-34). Kass appeals mostly to tradition as a justifi­
cation for this role of medicine. Throughout history, physicians have 
helped people "experience peaceful dying" but not "achieve a peaceful 
death" (p. 35; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted). 
Kass presents no argument, other than tradition (including "stan­
dard medical ethics"), for why the benefit to the person derived from 
the medical act must follow the act (p. 35). "It's tradition" is a weak 
argument. Many medical traditions have been abandoned, including 
exclusion of women from medical practice and much of the culture of 
the gentleman physician. 
Further, why must the benefit follow the act? In the case of as­
sisted suicide, the person who benefits is the one who dies. The benefit 
is the death. Kass is correct that this is not "healing," but rather relief 
from suffering.41 It is unclear, though, why serving the body and mind 
must entail healing and not relief from suffering, especially since Kass 
recognizes relief from suffering as a goal of medicine (p. 35). 
Kass argues that we owe a heightened duty to humans (humanity) 
that we do not owe to other animals, which we need only treat hu­
manely (p. 38-40). While relief from suffering may require the death of 
non-human animals, for humans it requires encouragement to live.42 
Kass justifies this distinction on the basis of what he perceives as some 
unique human characteristics: 
We put dumb animals to sleep because they do not know that they are 
dying, because they can make nothing of their misery or mortality, and 
therefore, because they cannot live deliberately (i.e., humanly) in the 
face of their own suffering or dying .... Compassion for their weakness 
and dumbness is our only appropriate emotion .... But when a con­
scious human being asks us for death, by that very action he displays the 
presence of something that precludes our regarding him as a dumb ani­
mal. (p. 38) 
There are conceptual flaws with this argument. Pig number forty­
five for slaughter at the local abattoir smells and sees death. Studies 
show that such an animal will manifest physical symptoms of stress 
40. I say "in part" because Kass also believes that medicine serves the goal of relieving 
suffering, which may be accomplished through analgesics. Pp. 34-35. 
41. P. 35. Suffering is understood as "pain, discomfort, and distress." Id. 
42. Kass suggests that acting only humanely will cause doctors to be "technical dispens­
ers of death." P. 39. 
May 2002) Assisted Suicide Reexamined 1399 
and fear and may try to escape. In this sense, the pig understands mis­
ery and mortality and acts deliberately. Pigs and other lower animals 
suffer if ill or mistreated, as they are sentient beings, capable of expe­
riencing pleasure and pain. Animals, like humans, are conscious in this 
regard. They have well-being; this demands that we act to preserve 
their interests. Kass does not demonstrate that it is morally right to 
terminate the life of a suffering lower animal yet morally wrong to 
terminate the life of a suffering human animal, especially when the lat­
ter makes an explicit request for such action. 
Kass might argue that he is concerned with relieving only some 
forms of suffering. An argument presented by Daniel Callahan in a 
subsequent chapter is of note here. Callahan suggests a limited duty of 
physicians to relieve suffering. Physicians, he argues, should do all 
they are able to relieve suffering associated with "fear, uncertainty, 
dread, or anguish of the sick person in coping with the illness" (the 
"psychological penumbra of illness"), but not with the "meaning of life 
itself" (p. 58) . Callahan views assisted suicide as relieving the second 
level of suffering. The justification for drawing the line at this point is 
physician competence; Callahan states that "medicine [cannot] man­
age the meaning oflife and death, only the physical and psychological 
manifestations of those problems . .. .  [its] role must be limited to what 
it can appropriately do . . . .  " (p. 59). Thus, the first level of suffering 
relates to the problems of illness, and the second level to the problems 
of life, presumably outside of illness. 
This distinction between forms of suffering is forced. Terminally ill 
patients request assisted suicide because of their illness; they are not 
questioning the meaning of life and death from an actual or hypotheti­
cal state of health. Further, the competence of physicians to determine 
the meaning of life and death for a given person is irrelevant. It is up 
to the patients to make their own determinations about living lives 
with illness. Physicians must only confirm that pain and suffering 
similar to Callahan's first level of suffering are present and that their 
patients are making autonomous decisions. In other words, physicians 
need only determine from clinical observation and medical measures 
that pain, discomfort, or other suffering related to the disease supports 
patients' requests for assisted suicide. 
In addition, Kass seems to be placing unjustifiable moral weight on 
the temporal difference between killing and letting die. He cites the 
famous withdrawal-of-life-support case of Karen Ann Quinlan as an 
example of how doctors do not cause death, since Karen, who was in a 
persistent vegetative state, "lived" for another ten years after being 
removed from her respirator. This is an odd assertion, since Karen 
might have died the next day. Regardless, without the removal of life 
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support, Karen would have "lived" longer; the doctor's actions clearly 
brought about her circulatory death, though not immediately.43 
B. The Actions and Omissions Distinction 
In addition, the articles in the collection operate against the back­
ground assumption that there is a distinction to be made between phy­
sician action intended to cause death and death arising out of physi­
cian omission or provision of pain relief. This assumption relies upon 
what is known as the actions/omissions distinction. The distinction is 
rooted in religious ideals, like the Commandment that "thou shall not 
kill." The main idea behind the distinction is that there is a moral dif­
ference between performing an act and omitting one, even though the 
same consequences result. So, under a literal reading of the doctrine, it 
would be wrong to shoot someone dead but not wrong to watch some­
one drown. In the euthanasia context, the doctrine is most often 
known as the distinction between killing and letting die. It would be 
wrong to provide someone with a lethal injection at their request but 
not immoral to fail to provide a surgical procedure at patient request, 
which causes death. Alternatively, the distinction might be expressed 
as providing ordinary medical care, but withholding extraordinary 
care. It also could be understood to support the provision of pain relief 
with foreseeable but unintended death. 
Rejecting the moral !)ignificance of the acts/omissions distinction 
has important consequences for the assisted suicide debate.44 If there is 
no moral difference between acts and omissions in this context, it is 
morally arbitrary to prohibit assisted suicide to relieve suffering and to 
provide only palliative care for this purpose. In this case, other argu­
ments would have to be made, for example, an argument about in­
fringement of rights or interests or the violation of autonomy, to sup­
port the prohibition of assisted suicide.45 The autonomy argument is 
discussed below. A rights-based claim would entail that someone has a 
right to life and desires her continued existence, correlating with a 
duty in others not to take her life.46 The autonomy discussion below 
43. In their contribution to the collection, Felicia Cohn and Joanne Lynn misunderstand 
this point. They state, "[a]lthough a physician may be active in removing life support, the 
physician's action is not a proximate cause of the death. If the particular life-sustaining tech­
nique had not been available, death would already have resulted." P. 247. 
44. This distinction cannot be fully discussed within the confines of this Review. See 
SHELLY KAGAN, THE LIMITS OF MORALITY (1989) and literature references therein, re­
jecting the moral validity of the acts/omission
.
s distinction. 
45. An argument from a person's interest in assisted suicide would be a consequentialist 
one, mirroring the above analysis. 
46. One could make other rights-based arguments stemming from an inalienable right to 
life, a right that one cannot dispense of through one's own deliberative choice. Under this 
understanding, taking one's own life may violate others' rights in the sense that one's death 
causes serious harm to others. In the alternative, one could argue that taking one's own life 
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suffices to address the rights-based claim with respect to a competent 
person's choice to die, but further discussion is warranted elsewhere 
with respect to noncompetent persons.47 
Returning to the main question, if it is morally acceptable to allow 
death (of the terminally ill) when life-saving actions are possible, is it 
wrong to assist them in suicide? From the view of overall conse­
quences, there is no moral difference between killing and letting die. 
In either case, the doctor knows the result, she decides to act based 
upon knowledge of the alternatives, and she must bear moral and legal 
responsibility for her decision.48 On this account, there is no moral dif­
ference between acts and omissions.49 A doctor's intention to kill or 
relieve pain is not morally relevant in this context because, in either 
case, she foresees the death, and the same result ensues. 
Kissane argues in the collection that it is not the outcome that mat­
ters morally, but culpability for the outcome, determined by the norms 
of clinical practice. Omissions that fail to prolong dying of irreversible 
conditions are part of proper clinical practice and do not carry the 
same culpability as killing, even if they have the same result. He states: 
For an action involving the omission of a treatment to carry culpability 
for causing death; the treatment must be proven to be clinically effective 
in the circumstances and the underlying condition potentially reversible. 
As the dying process unfolds in a terminal patient, the condition becomes 
irreversible, and interventions could cause harm through prolonging the 
dying if they were inappropriately applied. "Moral equivalence" argu­
ments based on outcome cannot ignore the assessment of clinical propor­
tionality and appropriateness. (pp. 207-08) 
Kissane's statements reflect a misunderstanding of what is at stake. 
The treatments in question, that is, those that are withheld, are for 
violates one's own right to life. These arguments are discussed by Joel Feinberg in his classic 
essay Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 93-123 
(1978). Feinberg concludes that the right to life is discretionary in the sense that it may be 
waived but not renounced or relinquished. The authors of the collection do not offer these 
arguments, however; rather, they focus upon the idea that consent will not be truly volun­
tary. 
47. Philippa Foot, addressing the rights-based claim of noncompetent individuals, . ar­
gues that one cannot assume that a noncompetent person who is suffering would want to be 
killed. She maintains that a duty of noninterference applies to active nonvoluntary euthana­
sia, but she supports passive nonvoluntary euthanasia as well as all forms of voluntary 
euthanasia. Foot, supra note 7, at 104-05. 
48. See SINGER, supra note 10, at 208. 
49. In other contexts, there may be extrinsic moral differences between acts and omis­
sions. The differences are extrinsic because they are normally present, but they need not 
come into play. For example, there are extrinsic differences between terminating the life of 
someone who is starving versus failing to donate money to help starving people. One possi­
ble extrinsic difference is that it is uncertain when one donates money, for example to 
UNICEF, that the money will be put to good use and one will save someone from starving. 
Whereas, if one shoots a starving person at close range, it is almost certain that she will die. 
This example is borrowed from Peter Singer. See id. at 223-24. 
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conditions that are easily reversible. Often they are antibiotics or other 
drugs for common ailments like infections, or they are minor surgical 
procedures.so These treatments are withheld because it is the patient's 
overall health prognosis, not the particular condition, which is irre­
versible. It is for this reason that withholding such treatments to has­
ten or cause death is of the same moral significance as directly causing 
the death of the patient who wishes to die. 
If anything, withholding drug treatments and minor surgeries ig­
nores clinical . proportionality and appropriateness. It makes morally 
irrelevant the factors that determine death. For example, it might be a 
throat infection, an intestinal blockage, or untreated nausea prevent­
ing sufficient food intake that eventually results in the death of a can­
cer patient. Also, death through omissions may be slow and increase 
suffering. A particularly dramatic example from another context is the 
documented case of untreated infants with spina bifida, a condition 
causing a lesion in the back that exposes the spine, who survived in a 
hospital for more than two years after birth with no treatment.s 1 
Contributor Yale Kamisar accounts for the use of the distinction in 
Washington v. Glucksberg52 on the ground ·that the right to refuse un­
wanted treatment supports "bodily integrity and freedom from un­
wanted touching" (p. 77; internal quotation marks omitted). The im­
plication is that assisted suicide does not. The failure to extend the 
legal notion of bodily integrity to a right to assisted suicide is, how­
ever, arbitrary. As Kamisar himself astutely states - the more the 
constitutional right to an abortion is viewed as grounded in sexual 
equality rather than a right to due process or privacy (bodily integrity) 
- the less the abortion right, perhaps the closest constitutional right 
to assisted suicide, offers support for assisted suicide (p. 72). 
The authors make heavy use of the moral validity of the 
acts/omissions distinction without showing much awareness that it is a 
very controversial assumption. Without it, they are unable to distin­
guish morally between a lethal injection that causes death and a 
morphine-induced death resulting from pain relief efforts. In addition, 
no distinction may be made on moral grounds between a lethal injec­
tion and withholding necessary treatment. The authors do not weaken 
the claim that palliation involving omissions accelerating death is mor­
ally equivalent to death by intended, direct physician action like lethal 
injection. 
50. In one American study, 81 % of nursing home patients with a fever were left un­
treated; 48% of those patients died. See SINGER, RETHINKING LIFE AND DEATH, supra note 
20, at 156. 
51. See SINGER, supra note 10, at 212. 
52. 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (holding that there is no constitutional right to assisted suicide). 
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C. The Autonomy of Those Who Wish to Die 
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Another conceptual claim advanced by the authors is that assisted 
suicide violates the autonomy of those individuals who are killed.s3 It 
is necessary to distinguish two forms of autonomy. Autonomy in an 
external sense is an absence of external impediments to exercising 
one's will. Autonomy as an internal conception is being a lawgiver to 
oneself in a Kantian sense, or determining one's moral maxims are de­
rived from one's own reason. These conceptions will be used inter­
changeably, but the context should make them clear. 
Since most arguments for a right or interest in assisted suicide are 
based upon arguments for autonomy, the conceptual claim that as­
sisted suicide violates autonomy deserves close attention. The · classic 
argument for assisted suicide is, in fact, that individuals who are suf­
fering should be able to decide when to end their own lives. It is for 
this reason that some proponents of assisted suicide argue further that 
physicians have a duty to perform assisted suici(je. As Dutch physician 
Pieter Admiraal quite powerfully states: 
· 
As doctors we have two primary duties: to ensure the well-being of our 
patients, and to respect their autonomy . . . .  The second duty entails that 
we listen closely to, and respect the wishes of our patients. Suffering, loss 
of control, and physical decline are subjective, experiences, and nobody 
but the patient herself is in a position to decide when enough is enough.s4 
There are several justi(ications for the conceptual claim collec­
tively presented by the authors. The overriding justification is that as­
sisted suicide necessarily involves coercion.ss It cannot be truly volun­
tary because of family, economic, and sodal pressures. Kass and 
others argue. that illness means dependence upon both one's family 
and physician (p. 24). As a result, familial needs, and the views of both 
family and physician about the value of living life with a terminal ill­
ness, influence the patient's desire to die. 
Physicians' influence is, in addition, bolst�red by their monopoly as 
professionals on vital information (p. 25). Physicians diagnose and de-
53. Ironically, one of the arguments presented by the authors against assisted suicide is 
that one may live a noble and heroic life without self-determination. Kass argues that 
"deaths we most admire are those of people who, knowing that they are dying, face the fact 
frontally and act accordingly . . . .  " Pp. 38-39. This appears to derive a duty from the observa­
tion of supererogatory behavior. While it is true that one may live a noble and heroic life 
without self-determination, as in the case of a prisoner of war, for example, a duty to suffer 
clearly undermines autonomy when someone would. choose instead to end her life to avoid 
suffering. Similarly to Kass, Callahan claims suicide is an inappropriate response to suffer-
ing. Pp. 66-67. 
. . 
54. Admiraal, supra note 2, at 332-33. 
55. Another concern of note is that an . individual with a terminal illness who is de­
pressed cannot autonomously choose to die. While I believe there are compelling reasons to 
reject this claim if one assumes that the individual is aware of her depression and treatment 
options (or lack thereof), the argument requires further examination elsewhere. 
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termine prognoses as well as treatment options, given costs and other 
limitations. The manner in which this information is presented and the 
number of palliative care alternatives suggested may directly deter­
mine a patient's choice to die. Edmund Pellegrino contends that in de­
termining what information to convey to the patient, the physician 
judges the patient's quality of life and makes a paternalistic assess­
ment about what is best for the patient (p. 48). Suggesting the option 
of assisted suicide may be perceived as indicating a duty to die (p. 24). 
While it is true that subtle or overt family pressures and directive 
physician counseling may affect patient decisionmaking with respect 
to assisted suicide, this is true for any other medical decision as well. 
Clearly the authors do not mean to suggest that a patient may never 
make an autonomous decision. Rather, their position seems to be that, 
when the stakes are high, that is, when the decision occurs at the end 
of life, autonomous decisionmaking is more important and extrinsic 
influences of more concern than at other times in a patient's care. The 
reasoning for this is unclear, as autonomous decisionmaking may ac­
tually be more significant at the beginning of a patient's treatment, 
when the treatment course for the terminal illness is plotted. 
Nevertheless, extrinsic factors like family resources and support 
and physician assessment of the patient's situation may play a role in a 
terminal patient's desire to die, and one may question whether a phy­
sician's advice, even within the legal requirements for informed con­
sent, may ever be value-neutral.56 While family and physician input 
may influence an individual patient's decision, these extrinsic factors 
do not affect what is of most concern with autonomous decisionmak­
ing: that is, that one decides what is best for oneself. Provided that the 
physician operates· within legal requirements for informed consent 
that enable patient choice, the patient's autonomy is sufficiently pro­
tected from physician influence. Family hardship and pressure cer­
tainly are not desirable, but it would be strongly paternalistic, and 
thereby a significant violation of autonomy, to suggest that the compe­
tent, terminally ill patient be forced to continue living in a state in 
which she does not wish to be. Some philosophers, such as Robert 
Young, argue that strong paternalism may actually support autonomy 
when it promotes an affected individual's life plan.57 This exception 
does not hold in the case of a terminally ill patient, however, whose 
life plan is sufficiently truncated. 
56. The issue of medical practitioner value neutrality receives great attention within the 
context of genetic counseling where abortion ·of a fetus may be at issue. See generally 
GENETIC COUNSELLING: PRACTICE AND PRINCIPLES (Angus Clarke ed., 1994); 
PRESCRIBING OUR FuTURE (Diane M. Bartels et al. eds., 1993). 
57. See generally ROBERT YOUNG, PERSONAL AUTONOMY: 'BEYOND NEGATIVE AND 
POSITIVE LIBERTY (1986). 
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A corollary to the authors' argument about coercion is that if as­
sisted suicide is perceived as voluntary despite the above-mentioned 
potential for physician influence, it poses a slippery slope to physician­
instigated, nonvoluntary · euthanasia (pp. 25-26). The physician will 
come to believe that she is justified in ending the life of incompetent 
patients, since she does so in order to benefit competent patients ex­
periencing the same or lower levels of suffering (p. 25). Thus, accord­
ing to Kass, "in actual practice physician-assisted suicide and euthana­
sia will be performed by physicians not out of simple deference to 
patient choice, but for reasons of mercy" (p. 25; emphasis in original). 
This line of argument is deeply flawed. In the case of nonvoluntary 
euthanasia, the guardian of the noncompetent person, not the physi­
cian, would make the decision to end or sustain life in accordance with 
what are perceived as the patient's best interests. When the patient is 
not suffering but will fail to recover, such as when the patient enters a 
persistent vegetative state, it is the interests of the family, not the phy­
sician, that matter. 
Another justification for assisted suicide undermining autonomy, 
presented by Callahan, is that it is inherently a social act. In other 
words, it takes two people - the physician and the patient - to exe­
cute the patient's will to die (p. 60). This argument relies upon a fun­
damental misunderstanding about autonomy. It is the patient's 
autonomous decision to die that matters, not whether the patient 
achieves that state with or without assist. Certainly we do not believe 
that the blind, deaf, or wheelchair mobile are not autonomous, even 
though they must rely upon social accommodation to be functional. 
Further, many executions of one's will, such as one's choice to be mar­
ried, to bear children, or to have an abortion safely, rely upon others 
to be carried into effect. 
Callahan suggests, within the context of addressing the classic re­
quirements for assisted suicide - self-determination and suffering -
that assisted suicide could be understood to limit autonomy, not be­
cause it depends upon another person, but because it requires suffer­
ing.58 The idea is that the requirement of suffering inherently limits 
self-determination (p. 62). This is true, but it must be so, at least within 
the context of physician-assisted suicide. The physician must act only 
to relieve suffering of the patient that she is able to confirm, at least 
roughly, within the realm of objective medical measures of disease 
prognosis and clinical observations of pain and discomfort.59 An argu-
58. P. 62. Callahan believes the requirements of suffering and self-determination are 
arbitrarily combined and therefore "offe(r] little resistance to denying any competent person 
the right to be killed, sick or not, and little resistance to killing those who are not competent, 
so long as there is good reason to believe they are suffering" P. 63. 
59. Callahan argues that suffering is demonstrated to be a poor indicator of the decision 
to commit suicide in general, where loss of control and mental illness are large factors, but 
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ment could be made for autonomously choosing suicide outside of suf­
fering as it is understood here, but that is an entirely different matter.60 
VI. CONCLUSION: PRACTICE VERSUS POLICY - ANOTHER 
SOLUTION 
The authors argue that the practice of assisted suicide is not suffi­
ciently restrained by legal and other protections. The solution they 
propose is to prohibit assisted suicide and develop and promote pallia­
tive care. I present arguments demonstrating that there is no necessary 
connection between tbe legality of assisted suicide and the availability 
of palliative care. They are not mutually exclusive. Assisted suicide 
need not undermine access to palliative care or force people to end 
their lives. 
Further, the main conceptual claims offered by the authors against 
assisted suicide do not withstand philosophical scrutiny. Assisted sui­
cide fails to violate the professional ethic of medical practitioners or 
the autonomy of the individuals who are killed. In addition, the fun­
damental distinction that aJlows both support for palliative care that 
hastens death as well as opposition. to assisted suicide - the acts and 
omissions distinction � is not philosophically sound.61 
It is for these reasons that the collection fails to establish a case 
against assisted suicide. It does succeed in causing the reader to ques­
tion whether assisted suicide is sound policy, even if it is morally justi­
fiable. In her classic article, Euthanasia, Philippa Foot discusses the 
difference between morally justifying some acts of euthanasia and le­
galizing these practices.62 SJ:ie maintains that there are profound psy­
chological barriers against killing as well as concerns about voluntari­
ness of death, due to both subtle and overt coercion that lawmakers 
should consider.63 Callahan argues more forcefully that the risks of le­
gaiized assisted suicide outweigh society's duty to relieve suffering, 
even when no other options are available.64 It would entail "a dispro-
he presents no data relating to physician-assisted suicide. Pp. 66-67. This is consistent with 
the view that such reasons would not be sufficient for physician-assisted suicide. 
60. See Julian Savulescu, Should All Patients Who Attempt Suicide be Treated?, 
MONASH BIOETHICS REV., Oct. 1995, at 33 (claiming that some patients who attempt sui­
cide and refuse treatment are both competent and rational and should be allowed to die); 
Susan Bailey, Should All Patients Who Attempt Suicide be Treated? A Response to Savulescu, 
MONASH BIOETHICS REV., Jan. 1996, at42; Julian Savulescu, Response to Bailey, MONASH 
BIOETHICS REV., Jan. 1996, at 44. 
61. I am aware that this case is not made conclusively in this Review. For a more com-
plete discussion, see KAGAN, supra, note 44. 
62. Foot, supra, note 7, at 111-12. 
63. Id. 
64. P. 65; see also Cohn and Lynn, p. 260 ("In developing policy, we must remember that 
physician-assisted suicide is about more than individual rights and distressing situations . . . .  
May 2002] Assisted Suicide Reexamined 1407 
portionate social change to . . .  socially sanctioned killing . . .  not easy 
to stop once unleashed in society" and discourage other remedies and 
supports (p. 65) .  
While the underlying concerns may haye some validity, they are 
insufficient to override the moral justification for assisted suicide. It 
seems likely, as James Rachels suggests, that opponents to assisted 
suicide who invoke psychological barriers are merely expressing an 
aversion to killing in most cases, like those resulting from domestic 
violence and street crime.65 They are displacing a general and under­
standable aversion to killing onto euthanasia, which operates for a dif­
ferent purpose, namely relief from intolerable suffering based upon 
irreversible, terminal illness. 
Voluntariness concerns, on a praxis level, also do not outweigh the 
benefits of having assisted suicide available. Consent requirements 
work against gross autonomy violations by the physician, while family 
and social pressures remain. People may choose to die because they 
believe themselves to be a burden upon others or because they lack 
the money to afford proper palliative care or it is otherwise unavail­
able. These situations are unfortunate, even tragic, but to demand that 
these terminally ill individuals continue living, suffering in perhaps 
squalid circumstances, is unjustifiably paternalistic. It is illogical to ar­
gue that the availability of assisted suicide precludes the development 
of palliative care; rather, political and social priorities are responsible 
for limiting such health care access. 
With respect to abuse, it is important to keep in mind that 
physician-assisted suicide necessarily involves a physician, who is un­
der a fiduciary obligation to act to relieve suffering based upon an ir­
reversible medical condition. The physician cannot kill a patient to re­
lieve her from an unwanted pregnancy, an abusive husband, a military 
draft, or a prison term. The arguments for physician-assisted suicide 
do not justify Sethe's actions. 
Hard individual situations make bad public policy."). 
65. James Rachels, Active and Passive Euthanasia , in BIOETHICS, supra note 2, at 229. 
